The latest attempt by caretaker Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-outgoing cha’s rule to coddle and recognise Myanmar’s junta government does not stack up. Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai planned an ASEAN-wide ministerial meeting in Pattaya on June 18 with Myanmar’s junta-appointed Foreign Minister Than Swe in unprecedented haste, sanctioned and endorsed by Gen. Prayut. Both the PM’s and FM’s clichéd answers, shrouded in controversy and desperation, simply do not wash. That begs the issue of whether the leaving government’s apparent support of Myanmar’s military administration, which took control by force on February 1, 2021, is motivated by reasons other than Thailand’s national interest.
Don had zero mandate but sent out invitations on June 14, just four days before convening the high-level event, although knowing he would soon have to quit his position as well because Gen. Prayut’s military-aligned United Thai Nation Party lost the May 14 election. When he controversially funded such seminars in the past, they took place before a Thai election. Furthermore, Don and his special envoy on Myanmar, Pornpimol Kanchanalak, have gone out of their way to organise a series of “Track 1.5” think-tank conferences that include Myanmar. The explicit goal has been attacked as providing legitimacy and recognition to Myanmar’s junta government, the State Administration Council (SAC). The rationalisation is intended to protect Thailand’s national interests.
Both Gen. Prayut and Don recited the typical litany of Thailand-Myanmar bilateral imperatives. These include the fact that Thailand shares a border with Myanmar of over 2,400 kilometres and thus must engage with its neighbour on common issues ranging from labour trafficking, illicit drugs, and arms trafficking to criminal call centres that have lured people from all over Southeast Asia and beyond to scam money out of others. At the same time, Thailand’s business investments in Myanmar totaled more than US$11 billion over 154 projects, placing third with 12.5 percent of total foreign investment in Myanmar.
It was also stated that additional US and other Western sanctions against the SAC—in this case, the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank and Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank—forced the Thai government to act. But, these arguments and excuses do not add up.
Actually, Singapore is the greatest foreign investor in Myanmar, with more than twice the amount invested as Thailand, with China coming in second. Yet, the Singaporean government has adopted the principled stance of adhering to ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus beginning in April 2021, which calls for a pause of violence, an inclusive conversation, humanitarian assistance, a special envoy, and a delegation visit to find a way forward.
Indeed, Thailand and Myanmar have serious bilateral difficulties in terms of labour migration, drug and arms trafficking, transnational crime, and even pollution from agricultural burning. Nonetheless, these difficulties remain as problematic as ever, if not worsening. Don and Pornpimol’s efforts in support of the SAC have yet to bear fruit for Thailand.
On the contrary, they have harmed Thailand’s international prestige, eroded ASEAN’s important regional role, and harmed Indonesia’s position as the current ASEAN chair. Thailand’s dubious stance has alienated the vast majority of Myanmar’s people, who have risen up against the SAC, backed up by a violent civil conflict in which the military is losing and unable to consolidate power. The Myanmar military may lose without major war weaponry like as armour and air strikes.
Don has harmed ASEAN’s standing in the world community by riding roughshod over ASEAN and Indonesia as chair. He has also fostered more schisms among ASEAN member states. After Myanmar’s coup, ASEAN has essentially divided into two camps, with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore on one side demanding the restoration of democratic governance and the others opposing it. It is unsurprising that despotic ASEAN states ranging from Brunei and Cambodia to Laos and Vietnam support the SAC while remaining silent on its atrocities against the Burmese people. These ASEAN members have been attending Don’s meetings, while the other four have repeatedly opted out.
Thailand, under Gen. Prayut’s foreign policy with Myanmar’s SAC, is the odd man out. Predictably, Don’s current move has been met with opposition from the democratically elected Move Forward Party and its leader Pita Limjaroenrat, who has emphasised ASEAN centrality and the Five-Point Agreement. All international players should be aware that the Prayut-led government’s stance on Myanmar does not represent the majority of Thai people.
To be sure, Thailand must interact with the SAC, but it must do so in collaboration with other parties, particularly other stakeholders in the Burmese civil conflict, including the opposing National Unity Government, in accordance with the ASEAN Five-Point Agreement. Thailand, as Myanmar’s neighbour, should work closely with the ASEAN chair to foster opposition group alignment and to urge the SAC into discussion by utilising recognition and formal participation as leverage. So far, the SAC has been unyielding and uncompromising. More appeasement will simply encourage the SAC and make it more self-righteous. The fragmented resistance alliance must also band together and demonstrate that they have the unity and resources to rule and keep the country together.
Despite being an outgoing caretaker, the foreign minister claimed that he had act because Thailand’s national interests “cannot wait” for the new administration. What cannot be delayed is debatable. Because Don and Pornpimol are prominent government officials, their integrity and motive are called into question. Because Pornpimol is a career – and convicted – lobbyist in a US court of law, the public has a right to know whether private interests are at stake here. The incoming government with a democratic mandate should conduct a formal investigation into this problem.